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From the Legal Literature
Francesca Laguardia*
DISENTANGLING PRISON AND PUNISHMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Abolishing prisons once seemed completely impossible, and to
many that impression likely remains. But the movement to abolish
prisons has experienced a marked increase in traction and legitimacy
in academic and activist spheres—although this traction has been
limited to non-legal groups, primarily.1
What does the concept of prison abolition mean to criminal law, in
general? And what are its purposes and role? In most quarters, the
movement is predicated on the horror of current conditions, collateral consequences, and unjust (heavily racially biased) application
of prisons.2 It is less often a direct criticism of the concept of expressive criminal law (the use of the criminal law and criminal punishment to express disapproval of certain behavior).3 Yet the language
of the movement most often rejects punishment as a goal (referred
to in punishment theory as retributivism or “just deserts”) in favor of
preventive, restorative, or transformational processes that focus on
lessening the occurrence of crime rather than expressing disapproval of it.4 Were criminal law to adopt one of these frameworks, it
would be a complete reworking of our understanding of the purposes
of criminal law in contemporary society.
Is a full reconceptualization of the purpose of criminal law necessary, or even desirable, in order to respond to the contemporary
recognition of the evils of incarceration and its collateral consequences? It is this question that Rafi Reznik addresses in his article,
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1

Introduction, in Developments in the Law—Prison Abolition, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1568, 1569 (2019) [hereinafter “Developments in the Law Introduction”].
2

Rafi Reznik, Retributive Abolitionism 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 123, 130–32
(2019); see also Dean Spade, Their Laws Will Never Make Us Safer, in PRISONS
WILL NOT PROTECT YOU (Ryan Conrad ed., 2012).
3

Reznik, supra note 2, at 138, 144.

4

Reznik, supra note 2, at 145–49.
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Retributive Abolitionism.5 Reznik argues not only that discarding
punishment is unnecessary to respond to the criticisms of prison
abolitionists, it is actually counterproductive. In fact, the primary criticisms of the abolitionist movement would be better addressed,
Reznik argues, through traditional punitive criminal law—but without
prisons as the punishment mechanism.
Reznik argues that, in fact, neither the scholars at Harvard Law
Review’s symposium nor Movement for Black Lives [MBL] activists
actually desire to eliminate retribution; to the contrary, their own
rhetoric shows they have a strong desire for maintaining retribution
in the public sphere, just with a focus on different actors and targets
of that retribution.6 He argues, further, that this punishment is not
only appropriate from the perspective of the individualistic and liberal
framework of the United States,7 but also that it is morally superior in
emphasizing offenders’ agency.8 Additionally, it reinforces the public
nature of certain harms and the unacceptability of those harms,
which is necessary in order for the state to acknowledge, express,
and reinforce the value of victims’ lives and well-being.9
Reznik’s solutions are still radical and would require a great deal
of further thought and development from legal and criminological
experts, as well as a massive social movement to reconceptualize
punishment. But even without approaching his solutions, his exploration of the motivations for prison abolitionism and its relation to
punishment, preventive justice, and transformative justice offer valuable insight into public perceptions of criminal law and its purposes.
II. Rafi Reznik, Retributive Abolitionism, 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
123 (2019).
Reznik begins with an introduction to the push for prison abolition.10
In order to delineate the problems and desires articulated by the
prison abolitionist movement, he relies upon the examples offered
by the Harvard Law Review’s recent symposium on prison abolitionism11 (most primarily the arguments of Allegra McLeod, the only
lawyer to be involved in the symposium).12 Reznik also relies upon
5

Reznik, supra note 2.

6

Reznik, supra note 2, at 126, 128–37, 138–43.

7

Reznik, supra note 2, at 137–45.

8

Reznik, supra note 2, at 155–64.

9

Reznik, supra note 2, at 168–71.

10

Reznik, supra note 2, at 127–37.

11

Developments in the Law Introduction, supra note 1, passim.

12

Reznik, supra note 2, at 125.
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the MBL as representational of prison abolition activists more
generally.13
Based on these representations, Reznik argues that prison
abolitionists do not reject punishment per se. Instead, he argues, the
complaint of prison abolitionists is that prison is used as a solution to
what are really social ills.14 Underlying this perspective is the notion
that people who are insufficiently supported by society are
“criminalized.”15 This may occur purposefully, because the system of
creating criminal law allows people with social power to criminalize
activities committed by people who are marginalized, which they
may do in an effort to maintain control of the population or to protect
privileges. But it may also occur because people who have no other
options to solve homelessness, addiction, and neglect, may resort to
crime, or such social problems may breed the conditions that create
crime.16 Prison abolitionists argue that investing in the social safety
net and other social programs would be preferable to spending
money on law enforcement and incapacitation.17 Prison in particular
is a problematic response to crime not only because it diverts
resources from the social programs that could better prevent crime
from occurring, but because it is dehumanizing and violent.18
But, Reznik points out, these criticisms relate more to the problems
of prisons in particular than the problems of retribution in general.19
MBL’s own existence and rhetoric throw this fact into stark relief (according to Reznik).20 The birth of MBL was a response to the failure
to punish law enforcement officers for killing unarmed Black boys, in
particular Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown.21 This suggests that
MBL activists would still desire punitive responses—it’s just that the
target of that punishment should include (if not focus on) people in
positions of power and authority as well as the marginalized groups
on which it currently focuses.22 As Reznik states later on “The
abolitionist imagination does not extend to, yet craves, non-carceral
punitiveness.”23
But perhaps more compelling is what this movement shows about
13

Reznik, supra note 2, at 127–28.

14

Reznik, supra note 2, at 129–31.

15

Reznik, supra note 2, at 130.

16

Reznik, supra note 2, at 130, 150–51.

17

Reznik, supra note 2, at 130.

18

Reznik, supra note 2, at 131.

19

Reznik, supra note 2, at 131–33.

20

Reznik, supra note 2, at 134–37.

21

Reznik, supra note 2, at 134–35.

22

Reznik, supra note 2, at 136.

23

Reznik, supra note 2, at 153.
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the use and meaning of punishment in society. To quote Reznik, “the
coercive outcomes of these decisions are part of the measuring
tools for the worth of Black lives, in the activists’ eyes too.”24 This
underscores the need for punishment in society as a way of publicly
highlighting how society views and values its members. The problem
is not that punishment itself is counterproductive or morally wrong, it
is that punishment has been unequally distributed; it should be
redistributed across society—so that the powerful experience it as
often, or more often, than the marginalized.25
This argument holds as well from a constitutional or political theory
abolitionist perspective. Prison abolitionists complain about
overpolicing, particularly in the way it undermines the tenet that “all
citizens be equally accountable to one another before the law.”26
MBL demands equal access to education and political representation, as well as community control of law enforcement and criminal
law.27 Many foundational scholars argue for more full recognition of
traditional civil rights and liberties, suggesting again that the issue is
not whether an entirely new governmental structure needs to be created, but whether the idealized rights of the liberal state can be
distributed equally among all of the state’s members.28
While the goals of the prison abolition movement do not seem to
require eradication of punishment, a good many prison abolitionists
have advocated for restorative, transformative, or preventive approaches to justice rather than punitive approaches.29 Preventive
justice focuses on reducing crime before it happens, primarily
through social supports that eliminate the opportunities and motivations to commit crime.30 Restorative justice attempts to provide accountability while restoring victims, offenders, and the community.31
Transformative justice attempts to accomplish all of these goals—
providing accountability, restoring victims and offenders, and
eradicating the social causes of crime—all together.32 While the accountability portion of transformative justice includes traditional
punishment goals of deterrence and incapacitation, it is voluntary
and oriented towards goals other than punishment for the sake of
24

Reznik, supra note 2, at 136.

25

Reznik, supra note 2, at 138–39.

26

Reznik, supra note 2, at 138.

27

Reznik, supra note 2, at 138, 140.

28

Reznik, supra note 2, at 142–44.

29

Reznik, supra note 2, at 145; see also, e.g., CRITICAL RESISTANCE COLLECTIVE,
ABOLITION NOW! (2009); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003).
30

Reznik, supra note 2, at 146.

31

Reznik, supra note 2, at 147.

32

Reznik, supra note 2, at 147–48.
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public satisfaction.33 Reznik describes transformative justice as
forward looking and utilitarian, focusing on reducing future crime and
restoring victims (as does tort law).34 It is also community based and
community structured, rather than state imposed.35 For several
reasons, Reznik finds such a framework wholly unsatisfactory, both
to his own mind and with respect to the broader goals of MBL and
prison abolitionists more generally.
Reznik’s first objection to a non-punitive criminal law framework is
the lack of agency and autonomy that would be implied.36 Bad actors
deserve punishment, Reznik insists.37 Moreover, ignoring this fact
and moving all moral responsibility for the offender’s actions onto
the offender’s social conditions or hardships undermines the very
human agency and fulfillment that abolitionists seek to protect by
eradicating prisons.38 Perpetrators must be respected as “autonomous moral agent[s],” and this respect requires treating them as
capable of making decisions about right and wrong.39
The state’s emphatic assertion of the value of every individual is
equally important, and it disappears if harms to individuals elicit
(only) a utilitarian response.40 Reznik argues that to focus only on
reducing future crime or restoring a victim to their pre-victimization
state fails to value the harmed individual, prioritizing instead the
broader social interests in a purely cost/benefit, utilitarian analysis.41
Such an analysis reduces individuals to mere numbers, or tools in a
broader social effort for generalized, overall maximized pleasure.42
This is insufficient, according to Reznik. Instead, “forceful condemnation” is needed in order to send a message that offensive behavior is
unacceptable and reaffirm the individual and deontological value of
the victim.43 To Reznick, moral condemnation and a forceful counter
message is a vital aspect of criminal justice.44 Without punishment,
33

Reznik, supra note 2, at 149.

34

Reznik, supra note 2, at 149, 154.

35

Reznik, supra note 2, at 149.

36

Reznik, supra note 2, at 153–60.

37

Reznik, supra note 2, at 156.

38

Reznik, supra note 2, at 154, 138.

39

Reznik, supra note 2, at 160, 163–64.

40

Reznik, supra note 2, at 159.

41

Reznik supra note 2, at 156–57.

42

Reznik, supra note 2, at 156.

43

Reznik, supra note 2, at 159, 163.

44

Reznik, supra note 2, at 161.
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this expressive aspect of the criminal law disappears.45 Moreover,
such a structure would fail its citizens by ignoring “our human and
social needs to assign blame.”46
From the perspective of prison abolitionists, Reznik states, the
problem in punishment is not assigning blame, it is a lack of trust in
the authority that does the punishing.47 Given the long history of racism and abuse in the United States, that lack of trust may well be
justified. Still, Reznik points out, if political institutions are to be held
accountable for their wrongful activities, and if heretofore marginalized communities desire to take hold of democratic authority and
power, that must include taking hold of the application of criminal
law and punishment.48 The issue is not abolishing the former state, it
is taking hold of the state. The issue is not abolishing criminal law or
punishment, it is controlling and participating in that law and
punishment.49
Reznick maintains that states can retain punishment while abolishing prisons (which, he states, are devastating, oppressive, “formal
facilitators of social death”).50 Prisons separate individuals from their
communities; they are fundamentally exclusionary.51 This violates
abolitionists’ “underlying conception of personhood . . . that who we
are is inseparable from the purposes and functions we undertake as
members of intertwined communities.”52 It also violates republican
principles that “for humans to lead their lives as members of a political community is natural, good, and necessary for the exercise of
freedom.”53 Prisons have become a psychic and physical banishment, creating social death.54
Reznick’s use of the term social death is interesting, considering
his proposed solution. The term “social death” has been used in
critiques of contemporary punishment and post-punishment regulation to highlight the post-prison ramifications of conviction.55 Collateral consequences can include disenfranchisement, deportation,
registration, limitations on family interactions, and limitations on
45

Reznik, supra note 2, at 161.

46

Reznik, supra note 2, at 162.

47

Reznik, supra note 2, at 167.

48

Reznik, supra note 2, at 170–71.

49

Reznik, supra note 2, at 171.

50

Reznik, supra note 2, at 173–74.

51

Reznik, supra note 2, at 172.

52

Reznik, supra note 2, at 172.

53

Reznik, supra note 2, at 172.

54

Reznik, supra note 2, at 174–75.

55

See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in
the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1788, 1790–93 (2012) (offering a
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places one can live and work, all of which can easily add up to a
complete alteration or, arguably, eradication of civil participation as
traditionally understood.56 Yet here, Reznick appears to argue that it
is the banishment within the confines of the prison that amounts to
social death.57 The solution he proposes is to abolish prisons, but
also to acknowledge and specifically rely on the punishment function
of collateral consequences as a replacement to imprisonment.58
Reznick acknowledges the severity of collateral consequences,
providing examples of “disenfranchisement; exclusion from jury
service; prohibitions on holding public office and serving in the
military; inability to legally obtain firearm; occupational restrictions;
limitations on parental rights; withholding of welfare benefits;
mandated regular registration with authorities [and far more].”59 He
agrees both that they create an “overwhelming infringement on liberties”60 and that they “should be understood as punishment.”61
But, he argues, the fact that they are punishment might actually
limit the use of collateral consequences in order to preserve their
positive (largely preventive) functions while jettisoning their harms.
To Reznick, the primary problem with collateral consequences is that
they respond to status (the status of being an offender) rather than
acting as an individualized and proportionate response to the specific
crime committed.62 He focuses on the retributive aspect of punishment as just deserts, and emphasizes that a positive use of collateral consequences would use these punishments only in order to
provide “the same satisfaction of desert as serving time.”63 This
would require “[e]stablishing rational connections between particular
crimes, offenders, and sanctions.”64 “[T]aking down the ‘doctrinal
wall’ separating [collateral consequences] from punishment” would
allow judges to apply them on an individual basis, in contrast to the
general and unthinking manner with which they are currently
applied.65
In this framework, Reznick argues that collateral consequences
broad introduction and overview to collateral consequences of imprisonment and
arguing that they amount to social death).
56

Chin, supra note 57, at 1790.

57

Reznik, supra note 2, at 171–75.

58

Reznik, supra note 2, at 181–88.

59

Reznik, supra note 2, at 176–77.

60

Reznik, supra note 2, at 177.

61

Reznik, supra note 2, at 177.

62

Reznik, supra note 2, at 181–82; 184; 189; 191–92.

63

Reznik, supra note 2, at 184.

64

Reznik, supra note 2, at 184.

65

Reznik, supra note 2, at 185, 193.
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could respond more directly to the specific crime committed than
prison ever could, and without the banishing effects of incarceration.66
He puts forward several examples to clarify what he imagines: tax
evasion, he suggests, is a crime against communal efforts, and so a
proper punishment might limit communal participation—in such a
circumstance he proposes disenfranchisement.67 Hate crimes “diminish another individual’s personal identity,” and therefore might be
countered with consequences that also relate to personal identity,
like prohibitions on name changes.68 Burglary “expresses disregard
for another individual’s personal space and possessions . . . [and
so] could warrant punitive measures . . . such as monitoring and
registration.”69
Reznick finds these methods superior to incarceration or the current framework of collateral consequences because they directly
relate to the crime and so are perfect “just deserts” to immoral
behavior.” He states, “The link between the offense and the right
deprived of the offender creatively satisfies the retributive demand
for a just proportion between guilt and burden, in a manner that
responds to the offender’s volitional choice rather than their
personhood.”70
This analysis begs a great many questions. Reznick acknowledges, but does not explore, the conditions regarding collateral
consequences that lead critical scholars to label them a form of
social death. Skipping over this analysis is part of what allows him to
claim that punishment such as disenfranchisement or limitations on
living arrangements could be used as punishment without infringing
on fundamental democratic interactions that make up personhood
and participation in democratic society. Failure to individualize
punishment may be one of the greatest flaws in the use of collateral
consequences, as Reznick claims, but it is far from the only flaw.
One could easily argue that the greater problem with currently existing collateral consequences is that the nature of these punishments
necessarily infringe on democratic participation (much as Reznick
argues that prisons are inherently a form of banishment). Reznick
borders on acknowledging this fact when he states “some [collateral
consequences] must be abolished . . . [specifically those that]
imped[e] the ability of the offender to maintain membership in a
66

Reznik, supra note 2, at 191–92.

67

Reznik, supra note 2, at 191.

68

Reznik, supra note 2, at 191.

69

Reznik, supra note 2, at 191.

70

Reznik, supra note 2, at 191–92.
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meaningful community.”71 He states that “denial of access to medical
benefit programs” would be one such consequence, without explaining why this might impede membership in a meaningful community
(particularly while disenfranchisement, apparently, does not).72
Moreover, Reznick’s allowances for certain forms of punishment
seem to undermine his overall point and his overall acceptance of
abolitionism. He is willing to allow that “some form of confinement
must remain part of the [punishment] arsenal,” which he states does
not conflict with an abolitionist perspective (for the containment of a
very few dangerous individuals).73 He does not explore what this
confinement could or should look like, but also argues that confinement might be particularly appropriate and just deserts in response
to certain crimes (although he does not specify what those crimes
might be).74
More than anything else, Reznick’s point is that punishment can
happen without prisons. His advocacy for use of collateral consequences seems to be largely in order to highlight that punishment
already does happen outside of prisons and, as he states, “[Collateral consequences] are the default because they are there.”75 He
would also allow judges to invent punishment that can occur outside
of prisons “as long as they are not inherently degrading.”76
III. CONCLUSION
Reznick’s solutions are provocative, and albeit somewhat
problematic in their simplified presentation. But his reminder that
punishment and prison are not synonymous is worthwhile as the
movement to abolish prisons grows. This reminder also highlights a
fundamental question that remains about our criminal law—do we
want to punish? Do abolitionists truly want to move to transformative
justice entirely, or is the desire to punish still strong even in these
activists, and would abolishing punishment even be a good idea?
While Reznick suggests that prison abolitionists are still secretly
retributive, his work is hardly a survey of abolitionist perspectives.
What Reznick contributes, however, is a strong argument in favor of
punishment as an essential aspect of criminal law in a democratic
system. His clarification and highlighting of these issues is a valuable addition to the ongoing debate regarding these essential
aspects of our criminal law.
71

Reznik, supra note 2, at 186–87.

72

Reznik, supra note 2, at 187.

73

Reznik, supra note 2, at 185–86.

74

Reznik, supra note 2, at 186.

75

Reznik, supra note 2, at 187.

76

Reznik, supra note 2, at 187.

762

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 4

